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TAXES AND THE STRUCTURE OF JAPANESE
FIRMS: THE HIDDEN ASPECTS OF
INCOME TAXATION
HIDEKI KANDA"
While governmental intervention into the functioning of a national
economy in the form of taxation is commonly observed across our planet,'
the overall effect of such intervention is far from clear. Those who
advocate using taxation to implement particular governmental policies
usually discuss whether one tax is better than another, rather than whether
using the tax system for policy purposes is wise.2 In contrast, others
simply argue that taxes are no more than an evil that brings about
distortions in the marketplace, without identifying the exact effect of such
taxes? However, these discussions fail to answer a fundamental question
which has seldom been seriously examined: whether and to what extent
taxes are relevant.
In examining the role played by taxes, it is important to note that a
particular tax's effect, that is, its degree of non-neutrality, is much more far
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OF SAUDI ARABIA 4-1 (Nicola H. Karem trans., 1977).
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reaching and puzzling than one might think. For instance, a particular tax
law may be designed to affect the form and process of capital formation in
a country by favoring one form of corporate finance over another. A tax is
introduced to encourage or discourage certain methods of financing. But,
financial structure affects the form of corporate governance. Thus, a
particular form of corporate governance might emerge in response to a
particular tax that encourages a particular form of corporate finance.
However, to what extent taxation has such "hidden effects" deserves careful
examination.
As scholars have noted,4 income taxation played an important part in
Japan's tax policy. As history shows, tax rules and policies are capable of
being transplanted across countries.5 But, such rules and policies may
cause different and unexpected side effects in the destined country if
imported in isolation.6 Whether any "lessons" are learned from Japan's tax
history can be shown only when the overall effect of taxation is identified.
Because Japan's high economic growth may have some correlation with the
corporate structure of Japanese firms,7 it is interesting and important to
examine whether and how income taxation affects the way that Japanese
firms are organized and structured.8
This Article addresses the influence income taxation has had on Japanese
firms. Part I examines the tax rule on tokkin, a simple rule designed to
accomplish a somewhat straightforward goal. Part II focuses on a more
general income tax rule-the two-tier taxation of corporate profits-and
analyzes whether a separate income tax for corporate profits affects
corporate governance. Part III addresses the "hidden" effects of income
4. See Hiroshi Kaneko & Yoshihiro Masui, Taxation of Interest Income in Japan-History and
Current Situation, in Taxation and Economic Growth: A Final Draft Report from Fair to the World
Bank, supra note * (focusing on interest income taxation).
5. See, e.g., Robin Burgess & Nicholas Stem, Taxation and Development, 31 J. ECON. LiT. 762
(1993).
6. See, e.g., G.A. Mackenzie, Reforming Latin America's Old-Age Pension Systems, Latin
America and the Caribbean: The Challenges Ahead, 32 FiN. & DEVELOPMENT 10 (1995).
7. See, e.g., Thomas E. McCarty, Challenge Your Japan Plan; Accessing the Japanese Market,
17 DIREcTORs & BOARDS 55 (1992); Renee Mathieu, The Prefabricated Housing Industries In the
United States, Sweden and Japan, 33 CONsTR. REV. 2 (1987).
8. For a discussion of tax law's effects on corporate governance in the United States, see James
R. Repetti, Corporate Governance and Stockholder Abdication: Missing Factors In Tax Policy Analysis,
67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 971 (1992). For an interesting comparison of corporate governance between
the United States and Japan, see Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese
Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871
(1993). See also Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the
United States, 102 YALE L.J 1927 (1993).
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taxation on firm integration. To illustrate whether taxes are an important
cause of a particular form of integration, the Japanese keiretsu9 will be
considered. Finally, a brief caveat concerning the potentially trivial impact
of taxation is provided.
I. TOKKIN AND CORPORATE STOCKHOLDING
Under Japanese corporate income tax law, when a domestic corporation
invests in another corporation's shares, the basis of each share of the same
corporation must be adjusted and averaged for income tax purposes.t 0
Thus, for instance, when a Japanese corporation, X, buys a share of Toyota
at 100 yen and later buys another share of Toyota at 200 yen, the basis of
each share in X's hands must be adjusted to 150 yen.
An exception to ordinary Japanese corporate income tax law is the
Tokutei Kinsen Shintaku, or tokkin. Apparently introduced to encourage
trading and boost the Japanese stock market," the tokkin system avoids
averaging. Under the tokkin system, instead of buying additional stock
itself, corporation X buys stock through a trust; X puts money into a trust
and the trustee buys the stock for X with the trust's money.
In Japan, a trust is usually not a taxable entity. 2 Therefore, the trust's
beneficiary is directly taxed at the time when income is realized and
recognized at the trust level. Thus, under normal Japanese tax law,
corporation X would have no tax advantage in setting up a trust to buy
another share of Toyota.
The tokkin rule, however, allows corporation X to separate the basis of
the securities it holds itself and those held by a trust. 3 Thus, in the above
hypothetical, corporation X may maintain a 100 yen basis for the first share
it bought and keep the 200 yen basis for the second share purchased
through the trust.
The special treatment afforded by the tokkin rule gives corporation X
wide discretion regarding the realization of capital gains or losses for tax
and accounting purposes. For example, suppose the market price of
9. See, e.g., KENICHI MIYASHITA & DAVID W. RUSSELL, KEIRETSU: INSIDE THE HIDDEN
JAPANESE CONGLOMERATES (1994).
10. Corporation Tax Law Enforcement Ordinance in Japan, Ordinance No. 97 of 1965, art. 34(1).
11. The intended purpose of, or the policy behind, the tokkin rule is not entirely clear.
12. Corporation Tax Law in Japan, Law no. 34 of 1965 [hereinafter CTL], art. 12. See Griffith
Way et al., Business Operations in Japan, Tax Mgmt. (BNA) 51-7th, at A-30 (1991).
13. See Akira Ikeya, Four Life Insurers Increasing Stock Funds, NIKKEI WKLY., Nov. 1, 1993,
at 12, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Nikkei File.
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Toyota's stock is 160 yen at the end of corporation X's tax year. If the
tokkin rule is unavailable, corporation X can of course decide not to sell
stock, causing no tax consequences. But, if corporation X decides to sell
the stock, the normal basis rule determines whether there is any gain or
loss. Corporation X can therefore choose not to recognize gain or loss at
all by not selling any stock, but it cannot choose whether to sell the share
that has risen in value to recognize a gain or to sell the share that has
dropped to recognize a loss.
However, under the tokkin rule, corporation X has an additional choice
not available under the ordinary basis rules: It can realize and recognize a
gain or loss. For example, if corporation X wants to recognize a gain, it can
sell the first share that it bought on its own account resulting in a gain of
60 yen. But, if corporation X wants to recognize a loss, it can sell its
second share held by the trust resulting in a loss of 40 yen.
As seen from this hypothetical the tokkin rule encouraged large firms to
invest in stocks. Therefore, the trading volume by large institutions in the
Japanese stock market increased.' 4 In short, large firms could take
advantage of this rule when stock prices rose over time. Thus, Japanese
firms issued an enormous amount of new stock to obtain capital.'5
Accordingly, the popularity of equity financing was the dominant
characteristic of the Japanese corporate finance market in the 1980s.
However, individual investors could not take advantage of the tokkin rule
because they operated under a different income tax rule.' 6 Thus, the
"institutionalization" of the Japanese stock market was accelerated.' 7
One might think that keiretsu, or mutual stockholding, was affected by
the tokkin rule. The effect of the rule on keiretsu is, however, not entirely
clear. At first glance, because the tokkin rule enables a corporate stockhold-
er to "manipulate" capital gains or losses, if such stockholder frequently
buys and sells shares it does not appear to help the institution remain a
14. See Kaoru Akiyama, Japan Investment Advisory Firms Face Shake-Out, REUTERS, Aug. 14,
1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File; Jonathan Sprague, Tokkin Fund Closures Seen
Pressuring Tokyo Stocks, REUTERs, Aug. 9, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, AlIwid File.
15. See, e.g., Shinji Takagi, The Japanese Equity Market: Past and Present, 13 J. BANKING & FIN.
537 (1989).
16. See Way et al., supra note 12, at A-117 to A-II8.
17. The regulator allowed insurance companies to treat capital gains from stock trading through
tokkin as income gains for regulatory purposes and include them as a source for distribution to the
policyholders. This encouraged stock investment by insurance companies through tokkin. It must be
noted, however, that two major classes of stockholders in the Japanese stock market are industrial
companies and large banks.
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friendly and stable stockholder of the issuer firm. An investor, however,
may buy and sell a number of shares of the same firm simultaneously and
thus recognize a capital gain or loss without changing the size of its stake
in the issuing company. In short, a high institutional trading volume of
stock does not mean a decrease in stable stockholding. It is thus plausible
that the tokkin rule helped to increase stable institutional stockholding.
II. CORPORATE LEVEL INCOME TAX
Whether a separate income tax should be imposed at the entity level is
a difficult question. But, entity, or corporate level, taxation for corporations
in particular has survived for decades in both the United States and
Japan.' Despite the recent and repeated attacks on this two-tier income
tax, it is difficult to conclude that such a two-tier tax scheme hurts
(decreases the productive output of) the national economy. Critics often
argue that the corporate level tax is an additional burden and negatively
affects the competitiveness of corporations, as opposed to partnerships or
proprietorships. However, it is well known in tax practice that the current
system of two-tier income taxation may often turn out to be less of a tax
burden for investors than one-tier taxation at the stockholder level. In
addition, corporate level taxation can be viewed as a device to reduce a
firm's agency costs.' 9
Given some form of corporate level income taxation, it is natural to
expect that business planning is devised to take advantage of existing tax
rules.. To take a familiar example, under a normal two-tier tax system, an
interest payment for debt is deductible to the debtor corporation while a
dividend payment is not.2' For this reason, a corporation might tend to
overissue debt in an effort to reduce its tax liability. Thus, the different
treatment between interest and dividends may affect a firm's capital
structure. The extent of this effect has been debated in the literature on the
subject.2'
Assuming that the applicable tax law favors debt over equity, there is
still another difficult question of whether this is desirable as a matter of tax
18. See I.R.C. §§ 301-85 (1994); CTL, arts. 1-164.
19. See Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs, and the Price ofIncorporation, 77
VA. L. REV. 211 (1991). For recent work on corporate taxation, see Jennifer Aren & Deborah M.
Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325 (1995).
20. I.R.C. § 163 (1994).
21. See Jeffrey MacKie-Mason, Do Firms Care Who Provides Their Financing? in ASYMMETRIC
INFORMATION, CORPORATE FINANCE, AND INVESTMENT 63 (R. Glenn Hubbard ed., 1990).
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policy. As a matter of corporate governance, debt might reduce a firm's
agency costs because it signals management's ability to generate cash
flow.' For this reason, if the amount of equity issued by large corpora-
tions is relatively small, the importance of tax rules, such as the tokkin rule
that favors corporate stockholding, would become even greater.
Another example of tax policy affecting corporate structure may be
found in connection with the rule on inter-corporate dividend deductions.
Under a normal two-tier income tax system, a corporate stockholder may
deduct dividends from its taxable income although typically the deduction
is not for the entire amount.' Because of this rule, auction rate preferred
stock developed in the United States. Such preferred stock became popular
in the early 1980s for issuers with tax losses as a substitute for commercial
paper.24 Under this scheme, the issuer has no room (i.e., income) to enjoy
the interest payment deduction, and the corporate recipient of the "interest"
in the form of a "dividend" is not subject to income taxation.25 This
scheme did not happen in Japan for a variety of reasons, but it is
noteworthy that the two-tier tax system has a number of effects on the
capital structure of the firm, as well as corporate stockholding.
III. PARENT-SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS
Income taxation in the context of parent-subsidiary corporations is
complex, but its existence naturally affects the ownership structure of the
firm. Suppose that a parent company, P, has two subsidiaries, S1, a
profitable firm, and S2, a firm producing losses for tax purposes. Under the
United States tax code, several ways exist to offset Sl's profits against S2's
losses. First, P, S1, and S2 may file a consolidated return under certain
conditions.26 Second, S1 and S2 may merge and offset profits against
losses by taking advantage of a "net operating loss carryover."2 Third, S1
and S2 can conduct transactions that zero out their gains and losses.
Although this option is available, it is interesting to note that S 1 and S2 are
penalized if they enter into a transaction that seems to be conducted at less
22. See Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989,
at 61. This does not necessarily suggest that a tax policy should favor debt over equity.
23. I.R.C. § 243 (1994).
24. See, e.g., Linda Ellis, Preferred Stock Issues Leave Wall Street Divided, AM. BANKER, Aug.
21, 1987, at 5; William I. Sartoris & Ned C. Hill, Innovations in Short-Term Financial Management,
Bus. HORIZONs, Nov. 1989, at 56, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mags File.
25. I.R.C. §§ 163, 243.
26. I.R.C. § 1222.
27. I.R.C. § 382.
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than at arm's length.2 For example, S1 may not agree to sell an asset
worth $500 to S2 for $100. In this setting, conducting transactions ann's
length is required for each transaction between S1 and S2.
However, in Japan, none of these three methods are permitted. It should
not be surprising that a tax system's attitude toward integration, corporate
groupings (keiretsu), and arm's length individual transactions varies from
country to country. In fact, the United States and Japan have different rules.
But, the question is whether tax rules are an important cause of one form
of integration rather than another. Why, in Japan, for example, did an
intermediate form of corporate integration, or keiretsu, emerge and survive
over the past fifty years? Did tax rules play "hidden roles" in this field?
In Japan, compared to the United States, the above-mentioned income tax
rules encourage integration. If the business operations of P, S1, and S2 are
put within a single entity, such entity would enjoy offsetting profits against
losses. Once SI and S2 are maintained as separate corporate entities, there
is no way of offsetting the losses.
Another important tax rule, however, must be noted. It is the rule about
corporate divisions. In the United States, two corporations may merge into
a single corporation, and a single corporation may be divided into two
corporations-both without paying income taxes at the corporate level-so
long as certain conditions are met.29 In contrast, in Japan, such favorable
treatment is available only in one direction.30 While such a "tax free"
merger of two corporations is recognized, Japanese tax law does not permit
a tax-free corporate division. Thus, for instance, two corporations, A and
B, which both have appreciated assets, can merge into a single corporation
without paying corporate income tax on the amount of asset appreciation.
Once they merge, however, they cannot go back and divide into corpora-
tions A and B without paying income tax at the corporate level.3'
This rule appears to discourage integration. What is the overall effect of
the above-mentioned two rules that appear to give opposite incentives for
integration? In a typical divestiture transaction in Japan, a corporation
transfers a part of its operation into a separate company without paying
income tax at the corporate level.32 The transferring corporation then
28. I.R.C. § 1239.
29. I.R.C. §§ 351, 356 & 368(aXl)(D).
30. CTL, arts. 2(xix), 27 (recognizing tax-free mergers). See Way et al., supra note 12, at A-29
to A-30, A-32, A-41 to A-42.
31. CTL, art. 93. See Way et al., supra note 12, at A-40.
32. CTL, art. 51. See Way et al., supra note 12, at A-32, A-42 to A-43.
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keeps the shares of such company without distributing them to its
stockholders. Such distribution would trigger a corporate level income tax
on the distributing company.
A somewhat weak form of corporate integration, or keiretsu, might have
evolved as an equilibrium response to these income tax rules. Under these
tax rules, if firms are highly integrated into a single legal entity, it is costly
to reverse integration. This suggests that firms avoid high integration in the
first place, or when integrated firms want to dismantle, they stop mid-
stream. That is, they create subsidiaries and keep the subsidiaries' stock
without distributing it to their stockholders.
IV. A CAVEAT
A particular income tax rule often has more far-reaching effects on
corporate governance and organizational structure than intended by the
rulemaker. The corporate governance structure and industrial organization
in a particular country may thus be better understood if one focuses on
various income tax rules more carefully. The purpose of introducing a
special tax treatment for a tokkin arrangement was to boost the Japanese
stock market. It might also have increased stable stockholding. The survival
of two-tier income taxation for the corporate form business might have
encouraged corporate form stockholding. While tax rules about corporate
integration were sometimes intended to prohibit abuses, they might have
unintentionally encouraged a particular form of integration, or keiretsu. In
sum, the effects of income tax rules could be surprisingly far reaching.
Nevertheless, overemphasizing such effects might be dangerous. In a
familiar example, if two-tier income taxation for corporations favors debt,
we should observe more debt than we do. There must be a variety of
offsetting forces that balance the effects brought on by tax rules.
V. CONCLUSION
While the advocates of governmental intervention through taxation tend
to focus on the direct effects of a particular tax rule, it is important to note
that taxes have greater and farther reaching effects. They can affect
corporate governance and organizational structures of firms. Indeed, a
particular form of governance and industrial organization may be better
understood if the overall effect of tax rules aimed at encouraging a
particular form of finance or those designed for stopping abuses are
properly identified. To know why and how a particular form of corporate
governance and industrial organization has emerged and developed, these
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hidden effects of taxes must be understood. Only thorough study of these
hidden effects of taxes would enable us to understand the structure of
business and industry.
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol74/iss2/5
